Impact of the regulatory framework for transmission investments on the cost of renewable energy in the EU by Meeus, Leonardo & Saguan, Marcelo
1 
 
This is the post-script version of the article published in Energy Economics,  
Volume 43, May 2014, Pages 185–194 
 
Impact of the Regulatory Framework for Transmission Investments  
on the Cost of Renewable Energy in the EU 
 
Marcelo Saguan 
Microeconomix  
5 rue du Quatre septembre, 75002 Paris, France 
 
Leonardo Meeus 
Vlerick Business School, Bolwerklaan 21, 1210 Brussels, Belgium 
 
Florence School of Regulation, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
European University Institute, Via Boccaccio 151, Florence, Italy 
Abstract 
Under the current regulatory frame in the EU, transmission planning is done at the national level to 
maximize national welfare, rather than European welfare. In this paper, we develop a competitive 
equilibrium model that calculates the impact of this imperfect regulatory framework on the cost of 
renewable energy. We apply the model to a power system with two interconnected zones, and find 
that the impact is case specific, but significant. We also find that the negative impact of national 
transmission planning on the cost of renewable energy is more significant in a state of the world in 
which Member States trade renewable energy, but that this negative effect is much smaller than the 
positive effect of renewable energy trade between Member States. We conclude that the imperfect 
regulatory framework for transmission investment is a significant cost for renewable energy in the 
EU, but that it should not stop Member States from trading renewable energy. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
The EU objective is to rely on renewable energy sources for 20% of the energy consumed in 2020, 
and the efforts to achieve this objective have been shared among Member States with binding 
national targets (EU, 2009a). The burden sharing agreement has been partly based on the renewable 
energy potential of the different countries, and partly based on their economic power. This implies 
that there are opportunities to trade renewable energy to reduce the cost of achieving the national 
targets (Admundsen and Nese, 2009), which is also allowed by the regulatory framework: Norway 
and Sweden are the first to organize cross-border renewable energy trade using a common market 
for green certificates. Aune et al. (2011) found that the cost of achieving the national renewable 
energy targets for 2020 could be reduced by almost 70%, and EC (2008), Capros et al. (2009) and 
Ecofys et al. (2011) consider that the annual savings could be up to €10 billion. 
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However, these studies assume that the transmission investments that are required to enable this 
generation cost reduction will follow. The importance of transmission investments to avoid spilling 
renewable energy and to reduce the cost of backup capacity in a power system with increasing share 
of renewable energy has also been underlined in the recent debate around the EU Roadmap 2050 
(Meeus et al., 2012). The electricity industry association (Eurelectric, 2010) for instance envisages an 
electricity generation mix with 40% renewable energy in 2050. The study considers 241 
interconnections between countries, concluding that the desired increase of interconnection 
capacity would be 40% by 2030 (from 179 to 253 GW), after which the grid capacity would remain 
stable until 2050. The European Climate Foundation (ECF, 2010) considers electricity generation 
mixes with up to 80% renewable energy in 2050. Their energy system analysis focuses on 15 
corridors, and calculates the desired increase of the total capacity of these corridors by 2050 with 
different demand flexibility assumptions. The desired increase of the corridors is 388% (from 34 GW 
to 166) in the 80% renewable energy scenarios without improvement in demand flexibility, which 
reduces to 274% in scenario with 20% improvement of demand flexibility. 
The problem is that these transmission investments will not necessarily materialize under the current 
regulatory framework in the EU. Transmission planning in Europe is mainly done at the national level 
to maximize national welfare. The National Regulatory Authorities that have to approve the 
investments are indeed mandated to take care of national interests. This can result in suboptimal 
transmission investments because cross-border projects that are beneficial for Europe, but not for all 
the involved Member States, can be blocked as Member States can veto or delay projects that are 
partly developed on their territories.  
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a model that can analyze the relevance of this 
problem in the EU context. Building on the work of Buijs et al. (2011), Buijs and Belmans (2011), 
Drondorf et al. (2010), and especially Sauma and Oren (2006, 2009), we develop a competitive 
equilibrium model that captures the four states of the world that are relevant in this context: a 
situation with no trade versus perfect trade of renewable energy across borders in combination with 
national versus international transmission planning. We apply the model to a power system with two 
interconnected zones to illustrate the relevance of suboptimal transmission investments for the cost 
of renewable energy. The example also provides insights into the sensitivities of the results to the 
differences between the zones in terms of their access to renewable energy sources. 
The paper is organized into 3 sections. Section 1 details the four states of the world that are analyzed 
in the paper. Section 2 explains how the four states of the world have been modeled. Section 3 
presents the results of the numerical example. The paper finally concludes with the main insights 
that we take away from this modeling exercise. 
1. States of the world 
Electricity wholesale market integration across national borders is an ongoing process in the EU 
(Glachant and Lévêque, 2009). The process is driven by cooperation among market operators, which 
is referred to as the coupling of markets (Meeus et al., 2005; 2011a; 2011b). For the purpose of this 
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paper, we will assume the market is already perfectly integrated so that we can focus on comparing 
two states of the world for renewable trade and transmission planning (Table 1).1  
 
Table 1: Matrix representation of the four states of the world considered in this paper  
 
Renewable energy trade 
No trade Perfect trade 
Transmission planning 
National 
1  
(current state of the world) 
2 
International 3 4 
 
1.1. Renewable energy trade 
Every country in Europe has a binding national renewable energy target, which have been set at EU 
level to share the burden of achieving the EU objective that 20% of the energy consumption in 2020 
should be based on renewable energy. The EU framework for renewable energy support schemes 
includes the possibility for member states to trade renewable energy to comply with their national 
targets, but they can also choose to develop their domestic renewable energy sources. We consider 
two extreme states of the world for renewable energy trade: no trade and perfect trade.  
In the first state of the world, there is no renewable energy trade. This is the current situation 
between most EU Member States, as indicated in the recently submitted National Renewable Energy 
Action Plans (EC, 2011). Only Italy and Luxembourg intend to import a small share of the renewable 
energy they need to comply with their binding national targets. In the second state of the world, 
there is perfect renewable energy trade. This is the current situation between Sweden and Norway, 
who decided to implement a common mechanism, a unified green certificates market. 
Note that the current situation with almost no trade in renewable energy in Europe can be explained 
by the existence of local benefits for the development of renewable energy technologies and non-
harmonized national support schemes. Renewable development policies are indeed about proving 
public support to renewable energy technologies. Some of the benefits are global, such as the 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions; other benefits are more local, such as the reduced 
dependence on imported fossil fuels and the creation of green jobs and technology industries (Lund, 
2009). Various instruments are being used, from so-called feed-in tariffs to green certificates systems 
and mandatory obligations regarding the share of renewables in the energy production sectors (Aune 
et al., 2008; Haas et al., 2011; IEA, 2009). To be able to trade renewable energy, member states need 
to harmonize their support schemes, or at least make them compatible. 
1.2. Transmission planning 
We consider two extreme states of the world for transmission planning: national planning and 
international planning. As discussed in the introduction, the current state of the world in EU is 
                                                          
1
 Note that we do not model climate change policies, such as the European Emission Trading Scheme: it would not modify 
our main results; including this scheme would imply studying other policy interactions that are out of the scope of this 
paper, but have already been treated by, for instance, Linares et al (2008). 
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national transmission planning. The third energy liberalization package and the energy infrastructure 
package include first steps towards a more international perspective for transmission planning in the 
EU. The third energy liberalization package, for instance, introduced the Ten Year Network 
Development Plan that tries to improve the coordination between the different national 
transmission plans (ENTSOE, 2012). The energy infrastructure package goes a step further by 
encouraging Member States to design innovative cross-border cost allocation agreements that can 
potentially unblock some projects with a benefit for Europe, but without a strong national interest 
for all involved parties (EU, 2013). However, without additional intervention, planning will continue 
to aim at maximizing national rather than European welfare (Buijs et al., 2011; Buijs and Belmans, 
2011). 
2. Modeling the states of the world 
We model a three-stage decision process, as in the work of Sauma and Oren (2006, 2009). In the first 
stage, the transmission capacity is decided, followed by the generation investments in the second 
stage, and the production and consumption schedules in the third stage. At each stage, the reaction 
of the next stage is anticipated. A first novelty of the model is that it also includes a two-zone system 
managed by two different transmission system operators regulated by a different national regulatory 
authority that jointly decide on the capacity of the interconnector between them. Buijs et al. (2011), 
Buijs and Belmans (2011) and Drondorf et al. (2010) already studied multi-zone systems with 
different transmission planning objectives, but they did it in a two-stage decision process without 
generation investment. A second novelty of the model is that it includes the possibility to integrate 
renewable energy support schemes. Linares et al (2008) already studied this type of schemes, but 
they did it in a single zone system, without considering transmission investments.  
In order to focus on imperfections in transmission and renewable policies, we assume competitive 
behavior of electricity generators. This introduces a supplementary difference with respect to the 
Sauma and Oren (2006, 2009) framework, which includes oligopolistic (Cournot) behavior for 
electricity generators. We could have represented the model as an optimization program, but we 
have instead chosen for a competitive equilibrium representation as it is closer to the functioning of 
electricity markets, and it can easily be extended.  
In this section, we first introduce the characteristics of the two-zone power system that will be 
modeled, to then discuss each of the three decision stages. 
2.1. Power system characteristics 
In what follows, we introduce the characteristics of demand, generation, and transmission in the 
two-zone power system that is modeled in this paper (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: two-zone electricity system 
First is the electricity demand. We represent demand by a load duration curve to simplify the 
analysis, but it does imply that we do not take into account the short-term variability of demand and 
renewable energy sources so that backup costs are underestimated. In each zone  , the curve 
consists of   different periods   with a certain duration    (measured in hours) and a level of demand 
    (expressed in MW’s) (see Figure 2). Demand is inelastic, but the model does include the 
possibility of having shortages. The unsatisfied demand in period   (in MW) in zone   is    . In hours 
with shortages, the price is fixed to the so-called Value of Lost Load (    ). Note that in our model 
     is an exogenous parameter set at the conventional value between 1000 and 10 000 €/MWh.  
 
Figure 2: load duration curve 
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Second is generation, which is represented by different types of generation technologies. There are   
types of conventional generation technologies and   types of renewable energy technologies in each 
zone  . The cost of each technology is described with two parameters: the variable operating cost (in 
€/MWh), which is      for the conventional generation technologies and       for the renewable 
energy technologies, and the annual investment capacity cost (in €/MW.year), which is      for the 
conventional generation technologies and       for the renewable energy technologies.     
and      are the installed generation capacities of the conventional and renewable generation 
technologies types, with       and        the energy they produce in a period  . We assume that 
conventional capacity is 100% available throughout the year (i.e., no unforeseen outages and no 
need to stop for maintenance), while we do apply an availability factor to renewable generation. 
       is this factor, which is given for  a certain type of renewable technology, in a certain zone, and 
in a certain period. 
Third is transmission, which is the line interconnecting the two zones. The line has a certain 
transmission capacity      (in MW) that caps the energy that can be transferred between the zones. 
We assume that the interconnector does not have losses or other variable cost. The annualized cost 
of expanding the transmission capacity is given by       (in €/MW.year). 
2.2. Electricity market 
In the third stage of the model, consumption and production decisions are made for a given set of 
generation capacities (   ,     ), and a given interconnection capacity (    ). The market 
operator matches demand and supply in each zone and period, taking into account the 
interconnection capacity constraint, and determining the electricity market prices. In what follows, 
we explain how this has been modeled. Note that we use complementarity notation to represent 
optimality conditions in this paper. 2 
2.2.1. Demand 
Consumers valorize electricity consumption (       ) at      level and buy it at             . 
The following equation represents the optimality conditions that maximize the net surplus of 
consumers in each zone   and period  . 
Equation (1):                                              
Equation 1 ensures that in periods and zones when demand can be satisfied (    = 0), the electricity 
price will be lower than the value of lost load (VOLL), while in periods and zones with lost load (    > 
0), the electricity price is set at the level of the VOLL. 
2.2.2. Generation 
We model a competitive equilibrium, which means generators do not behave strategically to 
increase prices; they simply bid their variables costs. As a result, prices reflect the variable costs of 
the last plant that is needed to match demand, respecting of course their (available) capacity 
constraints (    and             ). The optimality conditions for the generators can then be 
expressed by the following equations, with       ,        the level of production of the conventional 
and renewable generators, respectively: 
                                                          
2
 The symbol   indicates complementarity and means that only one of the two conditions should apply. For 
instance the expression       ( )    implies that:     and  ( )   ; or  ( )    and    . 
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Equation (2):                                                      
Equation (3):                                                         
Equation (4):                                        
Equation (5):                                                   
Equations 2 and 3 ensure that electricity prices are high enough to cover the generator’s variable 
cost in periods where the generator produces (     ,        >0 and therefore              
              ,                              ). The equations also ensure that the 
electricity prices are lower than the generator’s variable costs in periods where the generator does 
not produce (     ,         = 0 and therefore                                   
                       ). Note that         and          are the dual variables of the 
generation capacity constraints, they are nonnegative and represent scarcity rents for each 
technology and period.  
Equations 4 and 5 ensure that production complies with the (available) generation capacity 
constraints. For conventional generation (equation 4), the generation capacity constraint ensures 
that production is equal or less than installed generation capacity (we assume that conventional 
generation is 100% available over the year). For renewable generation (equation 5), installed 
capacity is adjusted by an availability factor (      ).  
Combined, the above equations (2-5) also ensure that prices can only go above the variable cost of a 
certain generator, if this generator is producing at its maximum (i.e., dual variables of generation 
capacity constraints are positive,        ,           > 0). It is in these periods that the generator 
accumulates scarcity rents to recover investment costs, as will be discussed below. 
2.2.3. Market operator 
We suppose that the market operator arbitrates perfectly between the two zones, while respecting 
the limited interconnection capacity      and the energy balance in each period. The following 
equations represent the corresponding optimality conditions: 
Equation (6): ∑         ∑          ∑      ∑                                
Equation (7): ∑         ∑          ∑      ∑                                
Equations 6 and 7 ensure that demand matches production in each period, and if it does not that this 
demand is registered as unsatisfied demand.         and         are the dual variables of the 
balance constraint and their difference represents the marginal cost of production at the slack bus 
(zone 1 following our convention). 
Equation (8): ∑          ∑           ∑      ∑                            
                  
Equation (9): ∑          ∑           ∑      ∑                            
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Equations 8 and 9 ensure that what is exchanged between the two zones stays within the limits of 
the interconnection capacity on the border.         and          are the dual variables of the 
interconnection transmission capacity constraint for the positive and negative flow direction, 
respectively. These dual variables are positive when the flow is equal to the transmission capacity 
     (i.e., the transmission line is congested).  
The electricity price in each zone and period,            , is determined with the following 
expression, using the dual variables of equations 6 to 9:  
                              (   ) (             )           
Note that the prices of the zones diverge if the dual variables of equations 8 and 9 are positive (i.e., 
the transmission line is congested) because the dual variables of equations 6 and 7 are the same for 
the two zones. 
2.3. Generation investment 
In the second stage of the model, generators decide their production capacity in each zone, taking 
into account the given interconnection capacity between the zones (    ). In what follows, we 
explain how this investment decision has been modeled, first for conventional generation and then 
for renewable generation.  
2.3.1. Conventional technologies 
We model a competitive equilibrium, which implies that generators invest up to the point where the 
scarcity rents match the investment cost of the technology. The investment decision can then be 
expressed by the following equation: 
Equation (11):      ∑                                   
     (in €/MW.year) is the annual investment capacity cost of conventional technology   in zone  . 
Equation 11 ensures that a conventional technology is only chosen by generators (    > 0), if the 
scarcity rent that this technology will accumulate in a year of production is high enough to 
recuperate the annual investment capacity cost of this technology type. 
2.3.2. Renewable energy technologies 
In our model, we only consider renewable energy technologies are not yet competitive. Without 
extra support, their investment costs are too high to be recuperated with scarcity rents. But, the 
technology can receive public support in the model, which is an additional source of income that 
modifies the investment decision as follows: 
Equation (12):       ∑                     ∑                                        
      (in €/MW.year) is the annual investment capacity cost of renewable energy technology   in 
zone  . Equation 12 ensures that a renewable energy technology is chosen by generators (     > 0), 
if the premium             (in combination with the scarcity rents) is high enough for the 
investor to recuperate the investment cost of this technology type.  
9 
 
The premium in turn depends on the state of the world, which is perfect trade in renewable energy 
versus no trade. For the state of the world without trade in renewable energy between zones, the 
following equations need to be added to the model3. 
Equation (13): ∑                                                   
Equation (14):                               
Equation 13 ensures that the production from renewable energy technologies matches the 
renewable energy target in each zone (          ). Equation 14 sets the zonal premium equal to 
the dual variable of the equation that forces the model to reach the zonal renewable energy target 
(           ) so that the model achieves the target.  
For the state of the world with perfect trade in renewable energy between zones, the following 
equations need to be added to the model: 
Equation (15): ∑                                                         
Equation (16):                                
Equation 15 ensures that the total production from renewable energy technologies matches the 
combined target of the two zones (                ∑            ) so that the target of one 
zone can be achieved with investments in another zone. Equation 16 sets the zonal premium equal 
to the dual variable of the equation (          ) that forces the model to reach the renewable 
energy target. 
2.4. Transmission investment 
In the first stage of the model, transmission planning leads to a decision regarding the transmission 
capacity between the two zones. We model two states of the world, which are national versus 
international transmission planning. 
In the state of the world with international transmission planning, the transmission capacity (     ) 
is chosen to maximize the total welfare of the two zones, subject to the above discussed competitive 
equilibrium model (1)-(16).   
              ∑           s.t.            ( )  (  ) 
In the state of the world with national transmission planning, each zone is investing in its part of the 
interconnector to maximize the zonal welfare: 
                         s.t.            ( )  (  )                
As the two parts of the interconnector are organized in a serial manner, the capacity between the 
two zones will be defined by the minimum of the two investment decisions: 
         (            
 
  ). 
                                                          
3
 Note that the premium is calculated from a common RE target and it will be paid to all RE technologies, as in a 
market for green certificates. The model could easily integrate other support schemes, such as feed-in 
premium with specific targets for each technology, but this is out of the scope of this paper.  
10 
 
     is a Nash equilibrium because the two zones do not have an incentive to deviate from this 
position. Indeed, once the zone with the lower optimal transmission capacity has decided to build 
this level of capacity, the best strategy for the other zone is to build the same level of capacity. If it 
builds less capacity, its national welfare will decrease. If it builds more capacity, its transmission cost 
will increase without any positive effect in welfare because the interconnection capacity will be set 
by the minimal value (the capacity in the other zone).  
In both states of the world, the zonal welfare can be computed as the sum of consumer, producer 
surplus, and congestion revenue, minus transmission costs. This can be done based on the outputs of 
the model for a given level of interconnection transmission capacity (    ). Inline with current 
practice, we assume that each zone pays for the assets on its own territory, and we also assume that 
congestion revenues are shared on the same basis, which is fifty-fifty in our example. 
                                             
                  
 
 
                 
 
  
Note finally that the model assumes that electricity consumers pay RE subsidies, which is typically 
the case in Europe, and which implies that the subsidy is a welfare transfer from consumers to RES 
producers.4 In the state of the world without renewable energy trade between the two zones, the 
transfer (            ) is equal to the zonal premium (€/MW per year) times the renewable energy 
capacity (MW) installed in that zone and the number of hours in a year. In the state of the world with 
perfect renewable energy trade between the two zones, we assume that the total transfer is shared 
equally between the two zones.  
3. Numerical example 
In this section, we first introduce the data, and then discuss the simulation results. 
3.1. Data 
The data is representative for a typical power system. Here, we introduce how demand, generation, 
transmission, the renewable energy targets, and the renewable energy sources are represented in 
our numerical example. 
Demand is the same in each simulation, and equal in both zones. The following load duration curve 
has been used:   =22,000 MW – 1.37 H (H being the number of hours between 0 and 8760), which 
has also been used by Joskow (2008). In this paper, this curve has been modeled with 10 periods of 
equal size (i.e., 876 hours each); and VOLL has been fixed to 4000 €/MWh. The cost parameters of 
conventional generation are also the same in each simulation, and equal in both zones. The example 
has two conventional generation technologies, i.e. base and peak load plants. The conventional 
generators have an annualized capacity cost of 300,000 (base) and 80,000 (peak) €/MW per year, 
and a variable cost of 20 (base) and 80 (peak) €/MWh. The transmission cost is also the same in each 
simulation, and equal in both zones. Following Realisegrid (2010), the annualized cost of transmission 
capacity is set to 7000 €/MW per year. The renewable energy targets vary between simulations, but 
                                                          
4
 The alternative would be that taxpayers pay the RE subsidies, so that the partial equilibrium model we have 
presented here would need to be extended to become a general equilibrium model. 
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they are always assumed to be equal in both zones. The targets are expressed as the percentage of 
consumption that has to be covered by renewable energy, and we consider targets of 30%, 40% and 
50%, like the national renewable energy targets of EU Member States. 
The renewable energy sources are the focus of our analysis. We simulate three cases (Figure 3) to 
test the sensitivity of the results to zonal differences in the investment cost of renewable energy 
technology, and the characteristics of the renewable energy sources in terms of their average 
availability and the correlation of this availability with demand. The differences are inspired by the 
typically differences between photovoltaic and onshore wind technology, see for instance Joskow 
(2010), Burger (2013), or EIA (2013).  In case 1, the renewable energy sources of both zones are not 
correlated with demand, but their average availability and their investment cost are different. In case 
2, the investment cost and the average availability of the renewable energy sources are the same in 
both zones, but they have an opposite correlation with demand (renewable energy sources in zone 1 
is positively correlated with demand whereas the opposite is true in zone 2). In case 3, the 
investment costs are different, the average availability of the renewable energy sources is different, 
and they have an opposite correlation with demand. Note that case 3 is closest to reality, but case 1 
and 2 allow us to test which differences have a biggest impact on the results. 
  
 
 
Figure 3: Three cases with different renewable energy sources 
3.2. Simulation results 
We first provide an overview, and then discuss the results of one of the simulations in more detail to 
show how the model works. 
0
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3.2.1. Overview of the simulations 
Transmission capacity can reduce the spilling of renewable energy so that the same target can be 
reached with fewer investments in (expensive) renewable energy capacity. Transmission capacity can 
also reduce the need for backup capacity so that demand can be satisfied with fewer investments in 
conventional generation capacity. Yet, these effects do not play if there is no spilling (i.e., available 
renewable energy is always lower than demand), or if there is spilling, but the two zones spill 
renewable energy in the same periods. The same applies to the need for back up capacity. 
Table 2 indeed illustrates that the optimal capacity between the two zones is sometimes zero. In the 
state of the world without renewable energy trade, the optimal capacity is zero in case 1 and 3, but 
not in case 2, which is the case in which the zones differ the most in terms the availability of their 
renewable energy sources in different periods. In other words, case 2 is characterized by a strong 
complementarity between the renewable energy sources in the two zones. In the state of the world 
with renewable energy trade, transmission is more important because renewable energy 
investments can be concentrated in one zone, which can cause spilling.  
 
Table 2: Importance of transmission 
Renewable energy Transmission capacity at equilibrium 
State of the world Availability Target International planning National planning 
No trade 
Case 1 
30% 0 0 
40% 0 0 
50% 0 0 
Case 2 
30% 2000 750 
40% 3750 2250 
50% 5500 4000 
Case 3 
30% 0 0 
40% 0 0 
50% 0 0 
Perfect trade 
Case 1 
30% 0 0 
40% 2250 0 
50% 5500 0 
Case 2 
30% 5000 3000 
40% 6750 4750 
50% 8250 6250 
Case 3 
30% 0 0 
40% 250 0 
50% 2250 0 
The regulatory framework for transmission investments can, of course, only have an impact in 
simulations where the optimal transmission capacity is non-zero. Table 2 illustrates that in each of 
these simulations, national transmission planning results in suboptimal (lower) transmission 
investments. As Illustrated in Table 3, this has an impact on the cost of renewable energy, which is 
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the additional cost of serving load and reaching the renewable energy target that is imposed on the 
model. The impact is significant in each simulation with cost increases of 1% up to 89%. Table 3 also 
illustrates that the impact is strongly case specific, depending on the ambition of the renewable 
energy target, as well as, the renewable energy sources differences between the zones.  
Table 3: impact of transmission investment on the cost of renewable energy in M€ 
Renewable energy 
Cost of renewable energy 
for different type of 
transmission planning  
Impact of transmission 
planning on cost of 
renewable energy State of the 
world 
Availability Target 
International 
planning 
National 
planning 
No trade 
Case 1 
30% 8302 8302 0 0% 
40% 11069 11069 0 0% 
50% 13837 13837 0 0% 
Case 2 
30% 2838 2966 128 5% 
40% 3792 3978 186 5% 
50% 4745 5081 336 7% 
Case 3 
30% 8460 8460 0 0% 
40% 11280 11280 0 0% 
50% 14100 14100 0 0% 
Perfect 
trade 
Case 1 
30% 1330 1330 0 0% 
40% 1789 1887 97 5% 
50% 2256 4262 2007 89% 
Case 2 
30% 1262 1790 527 42% 
40% 2216 2700 485 22% 
50% 3169 3728 560 18% 
Case 3 
30% 857 857 0 0% 
40% 1144 1153 9 1% 
50% 1444 2102 659 46% 
Note finally that the table also shows that effects of renewable energy trade are of a different order 
of magnitude than the effects of transmission planning. The renewable energy cost increase due to 
lack of renewable energy trade between the two zones goes up to 570% in case 3 with a renewable 
energy target of 50%, in a state of the world with national transmission planning. In the state of the 
world with renewable energy trade, all renewable energy investments in case 3 go to zone 1 where it 
is much cheaper to build, where less capacity needs to be built to achieve the same target because 
the renewable energy is more available on average, and where less conventional backup capacity is 
needed for renewable energy because it is positively correlated with demand.  
3.2.2. Details of one simulation 
In what follows, we discuss the results of one of the simulations in Table 3 in more detail to show 
how the model works. We will illustrate the impact of transmission investment on: total and zonal 
welfare (Figure 4); prices (Figure 5); generation investments (Figure 6); renewable energy subsidy 
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(figure 7) and the different welfare components (figure 8). We focus on case 2 with a renewable 
energy target of 40% in the state of the world without renewable energy trade. 
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of transmission investment on total and zonal welfare. There are three 
key observations. First observation is that total welfare increases steeply until the transmission 
capacity reaches 3750 MW, after which it slowly decreases. The initial increase is mainly due to an 
increase of welfare in zone 1, and a smaller increase of welfare in zone 2. The slow decrease for 
higher levels of transmission investment is caused by the cost of transmission. Second observation is 
that the welfare in zone 2 is significantly lower than in zone 1 because the renewable energy source 
of zone 2 is negatively correlated with demand, while the renewable energy source of zone 1 is 
positively correlated with demand in case 2. Third observation is that zonal welfare in both zones 
increases for increasing investment in transmission until the cross-border capacity reaches 2250 MW, 
after which the zonal welfare of zone 2 starts to decrease. In other words, national transmission 
planning will result in 2250 MW transmission capacity, while international planning would result in 
3750 MW.  
 
Figure 4: Impact of transmission investment on zonal welfare 
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of transmission investment on prices. There are two key observations. 
First observation is that investment in transmission increases the electricity price in both zones over 
the full range of 0 to 3750 MW transmission capacity. One might expect that prices would increase in 
the exporting zone and decrease in the importing zone, but there are two explanations for the price 
increase in the importing zone. Firstly, there is a price reduction in some periods (e.g., periods with 
low demand in zone 1), which is outweighed by price increase in other periods (e.g., periods with 
high demand in zone 1), and we only illustrate the weighted average price. Secondly, the classic 
expectation is derived from a static model without investment, and as we discuss below the changing 
investment behavior in our model explains this price phenomenon. The second observation is that 
investment in transmission decreases the renewable energy premium price over the full range of 0 to 
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3750 MW transmission capacity. The increasing electricity prices indeed increase the income for 
renewable energy generators, which in turn reduces their need for subsidies.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Impact of transmission investment on prices (i.e. electricity market price and renewable 
energy premium price) 
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of transmission investment on generation investment. Note that the 
model calculates with steps of 250 MW. We illustrate less steps to increase the readability of the 
figure, and choose 750 MW so that 2250 and 3750 MW are included, which are the capacities 
corresponding to the investment in the national and international transmission planning policy case, 
respectively. There are three key observations. First observation is that investment in transmission 
reduces the total installed generation capacity from around 105 GW to 97 GW for an optimal 
transmission investment of 3750 MW. The reduction in installed generation capacity mainly takes 
place in zone 2 that has the less favorable renewable energy source. Indeed, in zone 2: renewable 
energy capacity reduces with more than 3 GW; conventional peak capacity reduces by almost 3 GW; 
while conventional base capacity increases with just over 1 GW. In zone 1, on the contrary: 
renewable energy capacity remains unchanged; conventional peak capacity reduces by almost 2 GW; 
and conventional base capacity reduces by less than half a GW. Second observation is that 
investment in transmission reduces the spilling of renewable energy because less renewable energy 
capacity is needed to achieve the same volume of renewable energy. Zone 2 indeed has a renewable 
energy source that is negatively correlated with demand so that renewable energy is spilled in hours 
with low demand if there is not enough transmission capacity to export it to the other zone. The 
increase in cross-border transmission capacity then implies that zone 2 can export its renewable 
energy to zone 1 in hours of low demand. Note that for zone 1 it implies that less conventional 
generation production is needed to cover demand. Third key observation is that we can now also 
explain the increase in electricity prices in Figure 5. Transmission capacity reduces the investment in 
0 750 1500 2250 3000 3750 4500
Price (average) - zone 1 49 49 53 53 60 62 62
Price (average) - zone 2 58 60 61 62 62 62 62
Premium - zone 1 12 12 10 10 3 1 1
Premium - zone 2 14 13 13 12 12 12 12
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renewable energy capacity and partially also in conventional generation capacity. This generation 
investment optimization implies a load factor increase for conventional generators. As the variable 
cost of conventional generators is higher than the cost of renewable energy technologies, electricity 
prices increase with increasing investment in transmission. 
 
 
Figure 6: Impact of transmission investment on the installed generation capacity mix 
Figure 7 illustrates the impact of transmission investment on the renewable energy subsidy in zone 1 
and zone 2. Investment in transmission decreases the renewable energy subsidy in both zones, but 
stronger in zone 1 than in zone 2. There is a double effect: the renewable energy premium prices 
decrease (see Figure 5: €/MW per year); and the installed renewable energy capacities decrease 
(Figure 6: MW).  
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Base zone 1 10,560 10,447 10,014 10,140 10,017 10,012 10,012
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Figure 7: Impact of transmission investment on RES subsidy 
Figure 8 illustrates the impact of transmission investment on the different welfare components, i.e. 
consumer surplus, congestion revenue and transmission cost. Note also that we do not illustrate 
producer surplus because we model a competitive equilibrium in which producer surplus always 
equals the generation investment costs so that there is no welfare effect. There are four key 
observations. First observation is that investment in transmission increases consumer surplus in both 
zones, but stronger in zone 1 than in zone 2. Note that this increase is mainly caused by a reduction 
in the RES subsidy level (Figure 7), which dominates the increase in electricity prices (Figure 5), while 
the same volume is consumed because there is no lost load in our simulations. Second observation is 
that investment in transmission first increases congestion revenues then decrease them to zero, 
which is the point at which arbitrage equalizes the zonal market prices so that the transmission line 
stops being congested. Note that both zones have the same congestion revenue because we suppose 
that they share the total revenue, which is the standard practice in Europe. Third observation is that 
investment in transmission increases the transmission costs, which are shared equally between both 
zones. Fourth observation is that we can now also explain Figure 4: the welfare of both zones initially 
increases because they both benefit from a decreasing renewable energy subsidy and an increase of 
congestion revenue, which dominates the increase in prices and in transmission costs; at around 
2250 MW transmission capacity zone 2 stops benefitting from this renewable energy subsidy 
reduction, so that increasing transmission investment beyond this point only increases the costs of 
zone 2, without generating any benefit. 
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Figure 8: Impact of transmission investment on the welfare components 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyzed the cost of renewable energy in four states of the world, i.e. with versus 
without renewable energy trade between zones, and with national transmission planning versus 
international transmission planning. We developed a novel competitive equilibrium model for this 
purpose, and applied it to a power system with two interconnected zones. We assumed that the 
zones are identical in terms of their demand, access to conventional generation technologies, and 
transmission costs, so that we could focus our sensitivity analysis on the differences between the two 
zones in terms of their access to renewable energy sources. We therefore constructed three cases. In 
one case, we assumed that the zones have different renewable energy investment costs, as well as, 
different availability, and correlation with demand. In the other two cases, we introduced fewer 
differences to see which are more relevant. 
The conclusion is that the costs of renewable energy are the highest in the current state of the world 
in the EU without renewable energy trade between Member States, and with national transmission 
planning. The potential benefits of renewable energy trade are well known, and some Member 
States have already started to trade, but less progress has been made on the regulatory framework 
for transmission investments. The negative impact of suboptimal transmission investments on the 
cost of renewable energy has also not been considered in other studies, or models. We find that this 
impact is case specific, but significant. We also find that the impact is more significant in a state of 
the world where Member States trade renewable energy. However, the positive effect of renewable 
energy trade in our simulations outweighs the negative effect of suboptimal transmission 
investments. In other words, the imperfect regulatory framework for transmission investments is a 
significant cost for renewable energy in the EU, but it should not stop Member States from trading 
renewable energy to already reduce that cost. 
Note finally that the novel competitive equilibrium model introduced in this paper provides a good 
indication of the cost of renewable energy in the four states of the world that needed to be analyzed, 
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but the model, of course, also has its limitations. The representation of demand with load duration 
curves, for instance, underestimates the cost of renewable energy. A possible extension of the model 
would therefore be to integrate the short-term variability of demand and renewable energy sources 
as well as various source of flexibility (e.g., generation ramping, demand response). The model could 
also be improved by including uncertainty, alternative support schemes with separate targets for 
different renewable energy technologies, and more innovative ways of sharing transmission and 
renewable costs and benefits. The model could finally be extended to include strategic behavior of 
generators.   
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Appendix 1: Nomenclature 
 
Sets 
  Types of plant - conventional technologies (e.g., coal, gas, etc) 
  Types of plant - renewable technologies (e.g., wind, PV, etc) 
  Period of load duration curve 
  zones  (e.g., France, Germany) 
 
Parameters 
Type Name Description Unit 
Demand      Value of lost load €/MWh 
     demand in period l in zone n MW 
   duration of period l (the sum of t(l) is equal to 8760)  Hours 
Generation       annual investment capacity cost for conventional 
technologies 
[€\MW.year] 
      variable cost for conventional technologies [€\MWh] 
       annual investment capacity cost for renewables [€\MW.year] 
       variable cost for renewable [€\MWh] 
        Availability factor for renewable r in zone n and for 
period l 
 
Transmission     annual capacity cost transmission  (€/MW.year) 
     transmission capacity of interconnector MW 
Renewable 
policy 
           minimal annual renewable energy to be produced in 
zone n 
MWh/year 
               minimal annual renewable energy to be produced in 
both zones 
MWh/year 
 
Variables 
Type Name Description Unit 
 (Primal) 
Variables 
 
       generation of conventional plant type s at the segment 
period l and zone n during one hour 
MW 
     maximal generation output (capacity) of conventional 
plant type s in zone n 
MW 
        generation of renewable plant type r at the segment 
period l and zone n during one hour 
MW 
      maximal generation output (capacity) of renewable 
plant type r in zone n 
MW 
     unsatisfied demand in period l in zone n during one 
hour 
MW 
(Dual) 
variables 
 
         dual variable for maximal production constraint for 
each plant s at period l and zone n (this variable is > 0 
when constraint of conventional capacity is active) 
€/MWh 
          dual variable for maximal production constraint for 
each plant r at period l and zone n (this variable is > 0 
when constraint of renewable capacity is active) 
€/MWh 
        dual variable for positive balance constraint (this 
variable is > 0 when balance constraint is active in one 
direction) 
€/MWh 
        dual variable for negative balance constraint (this €/MWh 
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variable is > 0 when balance constraint is active in the 
other direction) 
        dual variable for positive flow constraint of 
interconnector (this variable is > 0 when there is 
congestion in line l in one direction) 
€/MWh 
        dual variable for negative flow constraint of 
interconnector (this variable is > 0 when there is 
congestion in interconnector in the other direction) 
€/MWh 
                 dual variable for renewable energy global constraint or 
renewable energy premium (this variable is > 0 when 
there is not enough renewable generation, i.e., 
renewable energy premium has a positive price) 
€/MW.h 
             dual variable for renewable energy constraint on zone 
n or renewable energy premium in zone n (this variable 
is > 0 when there is not enough renewable generation 
in zone n, i.e., renewable energy premium in zone n 
has a positive price) 
€/MW.h 
(Output) 
variables 
              Electricity price at zone n for demand period l €/MWh 
            Renewable energy premium at zone n €/MW.h 
                  National consumer surplus at zone n €/year 
                  National producer surplus at zone n €/year 
                   Congestion revenue of interconnection €/year 
             Renewable subsidy at zone n €/year 
         National Welfare at zone n €/year 
 
 
 
 
 
